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ABSTRACT 
Prior to the early part of the 19th century, 
China’s economy had long been superior to 
that of the West’s. The Chinese’s ability to 
utilize science and technology had been 
instrumental in leading their enormous 
population to economic prosperity and for a 
while, superiority. During the 18th century 
European science and technology surpassed 
that of the Chinese. It is my contention that a 
variety of Chinese contributions expedited 
Europe’s prolific economic development and 
aided in its expansion. Perhaps with the 
assistance of innovations derived from China, 
the European economy was able to forge ahead 
of China’s economy. In addition to the 
Europeans developments there were several 
other contributing factors that led to the fall of 
the Chinese economy. Using historical 
background the latter part of this paper aim’s 
to explain the rapid growth that has recently 
occurred in China. In spite of substantial 
adversity, China has re-emerged as one of the 
most dominant economic forces in the world. 
To begin I will use historical background in an 
attempt to explain what China was able to 
contribute, both directly as well as indirectly to 
the development of Europe. It is also my 
objective to explain that a distinct correlation 
exists between Europe’s rapid economic growth 
and the fall of China during the 18th century.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to attempting to explain the long 
and rich history of the Chinese, it is important 
to lay the appropriate groundwork. A 
fundamental difference between the Chinese 
and the Europeans was and always has been 
their philosophical belief systems. This is an 
important piece of the puzzle concerning why 
Europe was able to develop so rapidly and why 
China’s economic prosperity ended just as fast. 
It was no doubt the philosophical or spiritual 
beliefs that most often guided the decisions of 
the influential Chinese and European leaders. 
It was those belief systems that led to decisions 
that subsequently shaped history. Obviously it 
is not feasible that entire populations of people 
could share the exact same spiritual 
philosophy. However, the Chinese main 
philosophy was Confucianism while the 
majority of Europeans believed in Christianity 
(Kang 2010, 25). 
 
CONFUCIANISM 
Confucianism is a belief system that is based 
on the teachings of Confucius. Confucius lived in 
China from 551 to 479 B.C. Confucianism can also 
be described as a philosophy model of human 
society and life (Kang 2010, 25-26). The idea of 
establishing such a system was because Confucius 
was troubled by the society in his life which was at 
the time period in China’s history marked by 
political instability and wars. A main component of 
Confucianism is virtues, such as respect, loyalty, 
honesty, hard work, politeness and generosity. 
Confucianism wants everyone to practice such 
virtues in order for the development of the 
harmonious society and a united peaceful China 
(Lockard 2009, 28-29). The Confucian code of 
conduct also calls for the observation of 
relationships. The superior must set a good 
example and the inferior must be obedient as well 
as submissive. Confucius created such a practical 
system of social hierarchy that many still follow it 
today. A prime example of Confucianism is the 
relationship between supervisors and employees. 
Another is the relationship between teachers and 
their students. Similarly, Confucius outlined basic 
relations in society that everyone needed to follow 
and observe. The first relationship is ruler over 
subject. The second is parent over child. The third 
relationship outlined is husband over wife. The 
fourth is older sibling over younger sibling. The 
fifth and final relationship that Confucius outlined 
was older friend over younger friend (SACU 2001). 
In addition, Confucianism encourages paying back 
other people for their assistance and their kindness. 
Another teaching of Confucius was that the elderly 
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have accumulated a lot of wisdom from life 
experiences and thus, should be treated with great 
reverence and respect. It was important that the 
elderly be honored by the young. This teaching 
unquestionably differentiated from the European 
perspective on social relations which largely relied 
on a class system. The impact of Confucius 
teachings in China are so widespread that his code 
of conduct can be described as China’s code of 
conduct. This is because almost all Chinese live by 
the Confucian code of conduct. It is visible in 
China’s form of government. China has never 
succumbed to Democracy because that would imply 
that a younger person’s vote is equal to the vote of a 
wise elder. Confucius teachings imply that elders 
make natural leaders and can set good examples.  
“It was arguably the Tang dynasty (a.d 618-
907) that made perhaps the most direct 
advances in governance, introducing a key 
institutional experiment that reflected 
these Confucian ideas: a government run 
by talent, not heredity, with civil servants 
selected through a public competition 
assessing candidates’ qualification, open 
(in theory) to all males and held at regular, 
fixed intervals” (Kang 2010, 31).  
From its inception, Confucianism has made not 
only a huge, but lasting impression on Chinese 
society. Over the years it has had a positive 
impact and more or less achieved Confucius’ 
goal of developing a peaceful and harmonious 
society in China that is not constantly at war. 
THE TRIBUTE SYSTEM 
Maybe the most important aspect of the 
rise of the Chinese economy was how the 
country conducted international diplomacy. 
Fundamentally, the Chinese realized relatively 
early on that war did not benefit anybody. 
Eastern Asian nation states adopted a ranking 
methodology by the 14th century known as the 
tribute system. The tribute system was a 
ranking system that, based on a variety of 
factors, determined the hierarchy of each 
nation state. Not all historians and scholars 
have been able to come to a consensus as to the 
extent or scope of tribute systems; most do 
believe that some arrangement, albeit formal or 
informal was used. It is clear that the Eastern 
Asian nation states were able to conduct 
themselves in such a manner that minimized 
war. “In fact, from 1368 to 1841 - from the 
founding of the Ming dynasty to the Opium 
wars between Britain and China – there were 
only two wars between China, Korea, Vietnam, 
and Japan: [ . . .]” (Kang 2010, 2). The system 
allowed the states to know where they stood in 
relation to each other. Military size and 
technology were among the factors that 
allowed China to dominate the region. By 
utilizing the tribute system many of the 
complications associated with international 
diplomacy were alleviated. For all of the nation 
states that abided by the arrangement, peace 
and prosperity proved tribute systems to be 
effective regarding diplomatic relations.  
AGRICULTURE 
Chinese inventions were often “labor-
saving” because of the large amounts of food 
that would be necessary to produce in order to 
feed such a large population (Needham 2004, 
61). Again, pointing out the wheelbarrow as a 
perfect example. In China the abundance of 
food production was paramount in keeping the 
price of food low. Consequently, inexpensive 
food raised the standards of living for the 
Chinese. The sizeable population had not been 
an issue for ancient China because of the 
attention that government gave the agriculture. 
“Of course in dealing with economic 
problems different dynasties in China 
devised different schemes. Yet in as much 
as certain background factors underwent 
little change, a number of common features 
in administration became perennial. One 
such feature was a vigorous and persistent 
promotion of agriculture by the State, 
virtually uninterrupted for 2,000 years” 
(Needham 2004, 50).    
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Each dynasty recognized the importance of 
agriculture and aggressively disseminated the 
message. 
CHINESE IMPERIALISM 
Imperialism in China did not begin until 
the 3rd Century BCE. In 221 BCE Qin Shi 
Huang was able to destroy the other six states 
in the region and unite China. By conquering 
and unifying all seven states in the region, Qin 
Shi Huang was recognized as the first emperor 
of China. Qin Shi Huang introduced common 
coinage as well as a unified system of weights 
and measures. China’s first emperor even 
standardized the sizes of axels on carts that 
traveled on the Chinese roads. The Chinese 
have a long history of brilliant innovations and 
discoveries. Perhaps, it was the first emperor 
who introduced the people of China to the 
prosperity that accompanied technology and 
innovation. China, being one of the world’s 
oldest civilizations has contributed a lot to the 
West. In Science and Civilisation in China 
(2004), Joseph Needham listed some of 
China’s most noteworthy contributions to the 
West as well as the West’s approximate lag in 
centuries behind China. “In case after case it 
can be shown with overwhelming probability 
that fundamental discoveries and inventions 
made in China were transmitted to Europe, [. . 
.]” (Needham 2004, 20). Some of the more 
extraordinary contributions Needham listed 
were gunpowder, paper, cast-iron, magnetic 
compass used for navigation, the crossbow, 
wheelbarrow and porcelain. Needham went on 
to list over 250 items invented by the Chinese 
(Needham 2004, 223).  
EARLY CHINESE INNOVATIONS 
The wheelbarrow is a prime example of 
Chinese innovation. The wheelbarrow was not 
known to be utilized in the West until the 
1400’s, while it had been common in China 
since the 3rd century (Needham 2004, 4). 
Another quality that the wheelbarrow possess’ 
is that it was used as a labor-saver. It often 
appears that the Chinese would find a way to 
accomplish their goal that did not include 
practicing chattel-slavery. It was most likely 
the Chinese people’s ability to innovate and 
discover ways to increase productivity that 
enabled their economy to thrive before 
Europe’s. It was perhaps through innovation 
that labor-saving technology kept slavery from 
becoming a foundation for Chinese society. 
Slavery, unlike technology was extremely 
prevalent in Europe during the medieval period 
(Needham 2004, 227-228). 
The ceramics that were produced by the 
Chinese in the 16th century were especially 
attractive to the Europeans largely because of 
the brilliantly colored glaze finishes (Needham 
2004, 113-114). Aeneas Anderson was one of 
the 84 men who accompanied Lord Macartney 
on his famous 1793 mission to China. In one of 
his letters sent back to Europe, Anderson 
commended China’s porcelain: “There are no 
porcelain shops in the entire world which can 
compare in size, richness or delivery with those 
in Canton” (Elman 2006, 80). It is apparent by 
Anderson’s enthusiasm that Europeans envied 
China’s wares. The premium quality of the 
ceramics from China spawned a wonderful 
reputation not only throughout Europe but the 
entire World. The phrase “fine China” was 
forever synonymous with high quality plate 
ware. Chinese porcelain was so highly sought 
after that many European’s tried, with little 
initial success to replicate it. The European 
chemists did not give up very easily and in 1750 
they had finally figured out the Chinese’ secret 
to making quality ceramics (Elman 2006, 80-
81). Consequently, the once extremely lucrative 
Chinese porcelain industry suffered, while 
simultaneously improving the Europeans 
standard of living. Porcelain is a good example 
of how Chinese technology was able to 
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contribute to European development. 
Porcelain, while only one good, clearly 
illustrates how it was possible that European 
success directly correlated to China’s economic 
downfall.  
Paper and printing are undeniably two 
of China’s greatest contributions to Europe as 
well as the rest of the World. China was the 
first nation in the world to have its own 
national currency (Needham 2004, 55). The 
Chinese were also the first people to develop 
wall paper as well as the first to make toilet 
paper. Perfumed toilet paper was documented 
as being manufactured for the imperial family 
as far back as 1393 (Needham 2004, 205). The 
contribution of printing by the Chinese to the 
West, helped to launch the Reformation and 
the revival of learning (Needham 2004, 53). 
Europe owes China an enormous amount of 
gratitude, or at least recognition for its printing 
contribution.  
In the West, especially in Europe, 
patents were an important process. Given the 
long list of innovations, it was unfortunate for 
the Chinese that they did not know anything 
about patents (Needham 2004, 224). The 
Chinese were very innovative people, 
constantly using technology to elevate their 
living standards. “China has the longest 
unbroken history of progress in science and 
technology (over 4,000 years) of any nation in 
the world” (Needham 2004, 224). However, 
the Chinese did not maximize the capabilities 
of all of their innovations and discoveries. A 
possibly causality could be that China did not 
foster an environment that was conducive to 
the entrepreneurial spirit. “Inventions in 
themselves, however, do not foster or inhibit 
science” (Needham 2004, 225). Despite China 
being more technologically advanced than the 
West for so many centuries, Needham believed 
one of the many reasons that China had not 
ever experienced an industrial revolution was 
because many of the Chinese inventions were 
used mainly for the amusement of the emperor 
rather than moving an economic society 
forward.  
A perfect example would be how 
gunpowder was primarily used as 
entertainment in firework displays for the 
Imperial court. The innovation of gunpowder 
did not have the same effect on China as it did 
on Europe. Europeans quickly embraced the 
discovery and utilized it as a tool for 
destruction. “The strange thing is that China 
was able to absorb these earth-shaking 
discoveries and inventions while Europe was 
gravely affected by them” (Needham 2004, 53). 
Needham also thought that the European social 
class system played a big part in the Industrial 
Revolution originating in the West (Needham 
2004, 230-231). Europe’s social class system of 
feudalism would ultimately prove instrumental 
in the rise of modern science in Europe. In 
Imperial China a social class system was not as 
prevalent as it was in the West. “The Chinese 
had the inventiveness, but lacked the social 
conditions for the elaboration of modern 
science” (Needham 2004, 14). 
Though modern opinion is beginning to 
change, many historians, especially European 
historians accredit the British imperial 
dominance of China to the technological 
supremacy of the Europeans. It is true that 
modern science and technology propelled the 
Europeans ahead of China. But, the 
contributions made by China bridged the gap 
for the Europeans (Needham 2004, 231).  
BLACK DEATH 
  During the 14th century a plague known 
as Black Death, would undeniably change the 
world. Black Death was one of the most 
devastating contagions that man had ever 
experienced. The first outbreak of the plague 
was believed to have originated in China in the 
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early 1330's. Trade between Asia and Europe 
had been increasing considerably, and in 1347, 
ships thought to be infested with rats from 
China reached Sicily. The ship’s had brought 
the disease with them. Since Italy was the 
epicenter of European trade and politics, this 
provided an ideal opportunity for the disease to 
spread. The plague, being carried by the rats, 
was conveyed to humans by the fleas that were 
living on the rats. The plague hit cities first and 
then quickly infected the rural regions. The 
Black Death spread so quickly, by 1350 one-
third of all Europeans were dead (McHenry 
1992, 297-298).  
The plague did not discriminate 
amongst the social classes; many of the 
European rulers were dead. Ultimately the 
plague allowed the wealthiest European’s the 
opportunity to gain control of their country. 
The wealthy and educated Europeans quickly 
seized control. The feudal system established in 
Europe made the transition of power almost 
natural. “The Black Death struck not only 
Western Europe but also the Mongol Empire, 
including China where it had originated. But in 
China no bourgeois arose to take control” 
(Needham 2004, 230). There were several 
predominant reasons why there was never a 
bourgeois revolution in China. Primarily, the 
Chinese had long benefitted from a stable 
government as well as the establishment of 
bureaucracy (Needham 2004, 231-232).  
The plague which had originated in 
China changed Europe forever. A claim can be 
made that inadvertently, China contributed to 
European prosperity by reducing its 
population. Black Death more than just 
devastated medieval Europe; it caused 
significant economic and social changes in all 
areas of the world (Needham 2004, 230). 
Fernand Braudel, an economic historian 
determined that it was in fact Black Death that 
had intensified the recession that had been 
going on since the turn of the century in the 
European economy (Braudel 1984, 78). The 
severity of the recession caused economic and 
societal changes to significantly speed up 
between 1350 and throughout the 1400’s.  
The power once possessed by the church 
had deteriorated. The role that the church 
played in society had also changed. The plague 
had decimated so many that a large number of 
Europeans began to question their faith in the 
church. Acclaimed sociologist Immanuel 
Wallerstein believed that the collapse of the 
church was one of the four elements that led to 
the European bourgeoisie gaining and then 
keeping power (Needham 2004, 229). Killing 
such a large number of people, Black Death 
radically transformed the workforce in Europe. 
The severe labor shortage brought on by the 
plague drastically affected the economy. Labor 
was in high demand and subsequently, 
commanded higher wages. In 1351 England’s 
King Edward III instructed his parliament to 
establish the Statute of Labourers, a policy 
designed to freeze wages during the labor 
shortage. Further turmoil ensued in response 
to the wage caps that were put in place. The 
plague that originated in China ultimately 
changed the European, as well as the world 
economy forever.  
THE JESUITS  
The Jesuits began arriving in China 
during the latter part of the Ming Dynasty, 
around the 1580’s. This time period in China 
was one of great economic prosperity as well as 
governmental disarray. “Michele Ruggieri 
(1543-1607), for example, entered Macao in 
1579 and initiated a Chinese mission in 1582” 
(Elman 2005, 64). The Jesuits mission in 
China was twofold. The Jesuits primary 
objective while in China was to convert the 
Chinese to Christianity. However, with them 
they had brought the understanding of 
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European science and technology. From the 
onset the missionaries assumed that European 
science and technology would surely be far 
more advanced than anything that the Far East 
had previously been exposed to. “Europeans 
increasingly thought themselves scientifically 
and technologically superior to others after 
1500, but neither the Chinese nor Japanese 
agreed with this perspective [. . .]” (Elman 
2006, 11). Initially the Jesuits had believed that 
their superior knowledge would aid them in 
converting the Chinese to Christianity. The 
early Jesuits categorically underestimated the 
skepticism of the Chinese. “Ruggieri 
introduced European mathematics, mechanical 
clocks, and prisms to gain favor among local 
elites near Guangzhou” (Elman 2005, 64). The 
latter Ming and early Qing governments 
experienced a mutually beneficial relationship 
with the Jesuits.  
Among other things, the Chinese 
emperors received intellectual insight from the 
Jesuits regarding cosmology and mathematics 
that led to a monumental breakthrough in 
calendar reform. It was only because of the 
Jesuits understanding of Western science and 
technology that they were ever permitted in 
China in the first place. While in China 
spreading their spiritual beliefs, the Jesuits had 
the opportunity to learn many new things. 
Surely, the Jesuits conveyed their newly 
acquired knowledge to scholars back in 
Europe. It is well documented that the Jesuits 
introduced European ideas to the Chinese. 
What is not as clear is, while on their mission 
to China, exactly how much new information 
the Jesuits were able to transfer back to 
Europe. A classic example of this type of 
knowledge transfer would be when Michael 
Piotyr Boym, a Jesuit who served the Southern 
Ming in the 1650’s, took the Map of the Middle 
Kingdom (Zhongguo tu), circa 1652 back to 
Rome in 1656. “The original manuscript 
conveyed Jesuit knowledge of China to Europe” 
(Elman 2005, 130). It is difficult to quantify 
with any level of certainty, how much the 
Chinese contributed to the European Jesuits 
later scientific discoveries. An impressive list of 
relevant discoveries makes it is obvious that the 
Chinese have an outstanding history of 
innovation. It makes intuitive sense that the 
Jesuits would often, intentionally or not, fail to 
credit the Chinese for knowledge that they 
transferred back to Europe. Language barriers 
made history difficult to pass down accurately. 
Often words did not precisely translate from 
one language to the other. Given our present 
day understanding of language it is reasonable 
to contend that a lot of information, especially 
intricate details more than likely could have 
been lost in translation. China certainly, at 
least for a short time, benefitted from 
European science and technology. What has 
always been less evident is that the Europeans, 
while in the Far East, were simultaneously 
gaining an equal amount of knowledge from 
the Chinese.  
The Chinese intellectuals were 
undoubtedly interested in capitalizing from the 
Jesuits understanding of the physical sciences. 
However, they grew tired of the religious 
message that accompanied the European 
Jesuits. The Chinese acknowledged and 
appreciated the utility of Western science but 
had no interest in expanding on, or developing 
any open trade policy with the Europeans.  
“The Ming and Qing imperial court induced 
Jesuit mathematical, astronomical, military, 
and mensuration experts to work as 
minions in the government bureaucracy to 
augment each dynasty’s own project of 
political and cultural control. Consequently, 
it would be a mistake to underestimate 
Chinese efforts to master on their own 
terms the Western learning of the Jesuits in 
the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth 
centuries” (Elman 2006, 13). 
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It was only fitting that Benjamin A. Elman, a 
professor of East Asian Studies at Princeton 
titled his 2005 book on science in China, On 
Their Own Terms. Elman’s choice of title fit 
seamlessly with the mentality of the Chinese 
intellectual elite during the early part of the 
Qing Dynasty. The Chinese appreciated the 
knowledge shared by the Jesuits from the 
West. However, while appreciative they did not 
feel obligated to extend the Europeans any 
further courtesies. Many of the Chinese 
scholars shared the mentality of “thanks, but 
we will take it from here”. 
EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM IN CHINA 
   Prior to the 19th century China was a 
very self-sufficient nation. China’s strong 
markets had put the nation in a position of 
economic prosperity. The English continued to 
use science and religion as their primary means 
of diplomacy. Through those channels they 
were hopeful that China would eventually agree 
to open international trade that was not so 
deeply regulated. “British Protestants-secular 
and religious- perceived the Qing empire as an 
obstacle to open commerce and Christian 
evangelism” (Elman 2006, 100). While 
expansion of trade would benefit both nations, 
the Europeans had more to gain from trade 
with China.   
Since the eighteenth century, the 
Chinese government had enacted severe 
limitations on foreign trade, and was both 
apprehensive and disapproving of foreigners. 
Direct oceanic trade between China and 
Europe began during the sixteenth century. At 
first trade was led by the Portuguese and the 
Spanish. They brought silver to China from the 
Americas to trade for silk. Later the Spanish 
and Portuguese were joined by the British and 
Dutch. Originally trading took place at several 
ports all along the Chinese coast, but gradually 
the Chinese government restricted Western 
trade to only one port, Canton. The port at 
Canton was the only market open to foreign 
commerce. The Chinese preferred to limit 
international trade to one port so that the 
government could more easily collect taxes 
(Tagliacozzo 2011, 234-235). The Cohong were 
a group of merchants licensed by the Chinese 
whom were granted exclusive trading rights to 
deal with the Westerners. For the British side, 
the East India Company, granted approval 
from the King, similarly had a monopoly of 
trade with both India and China. The E.I.C. 
purchased silks and tea from the Chinese but 
did not have that much to offer in return except 
for silver.  
For many years this system was 
acceptable to both the Chinese and the 
Europeans. As the demand for tea increased 
and the Industrial Revolution led the 
Europeans to expand their manufactured 
goods into more markets, the British began to 
try to expand their trade opportunities in 
China. The British assumed that they were 
going to establish Western-style diplomatic 
relations with the Chinese. As stated earlier, 
the Chinese had historically utilized a tribute 
system with all issues pertaining to 
international diplomacy. The Europeans 
attempted to use Western-style diplomacy to 
expand trade with China. The most famous 
attempt by the British to expand European 
trade with China was made by Lord Macartney 
in 1793. Professor Immanuel Chung-Yueh Hsu, 
a scholar of modern Chinese intellectual and 
diplomatic history at the University of 
California at Santa Barbara outlined Lord 
Macartney’s mission to China. Macartney’s 
mission had six main objectives:  
 
1. To acquire one or two places near the tea- 
and silk-producing and the woolen-
consuming areas, where the British traders 
might reside and English jurisdiction be 
exercised.  
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2. To negotiate a commercial treaty with a view 
to extending trade throughout China if 
possible.  
3. To relieve existing abuses at Canton. 
4. To create a desire in China for British 
products.  
5. To arrange diplomatic representation at 
Peking.  
6. To open Japan, Cochin China, and the 
Eastern Islands to British commerce (Hsu 
1995, 156-157). 
 
The British led European Imperialists 
desperately wanted to have some sort of social, 
economic or political influence in China (Hsu 
1995, 155). For a long time the Europeans did 
not have anything that the Chinese viewed to 
have exceptional value. China did not have the 
desire nor need to adopt European technology. 
“In 1793, when the British envoy Lord 
Macartney arrived in China and proposed the 
opening of trade, Emperor Qianlong famously 
replied, ‘We possess all things. I [. . .] have no 
use for your manufactures’ ” (Vogel 2011, 695). 
It was not until the Europeans imperialized 
India that they discovered their opportunity to 
permeate the Chinese markets. India was rich 
with opium, which would turn out to be 
extremely lucrative for the Europeans.               
Opium became instrumental in 
affording Europe the opportunity to exalt its 
influence in China. Opium had previously been 
available in China despite being officially 
prohibited by Emperor Yongzheng of the Qing 
Dynasty in 1729. It was because of the abysmal 
effects associated with the drug that 
recreational use of opium had also been 
banned in Europe. Historically, opium had 
been rather scarce in China. The scarcity of the 
narcotic in China consequently drove the price 
way up. The British East India Company was 
able to establish a monopoly on the opium 
trade and in-turn they were able to deal it 
exclusively to the east (Elman 2006, 101). The 
opium market was of substantial economic 
significance to the British. The profits that were 
flooding in from the commodity contributed 
considerably to the revenue of the British 
Imperialized India. The British government 
also benefitted from the tax that was levied on 
the tea that was being imported from China at 
the same time. Additionally, the merchants 
who traded the opium obviously benefitted as 
well. The opium was trafficked primarily by the 
British East India Company into China (Elman 
2006, 100). The result, a severe illegal opium 
trade had spawned and the Europeans were 
directly profiting at the expense of the Chinese 
(Elman 2006, 6).   
Essentially, opium sales to China were 
profitable for everyone, except the Chinese. 
Ultimately, the Europeans introduced millions 
of Chinese people to the highly addictive 
narcotic. During the 1820’s many Chinese 
became addicted to the European supplied 
opium, it had become an epidemic. “From 1823 
to 1824, $8,515,100 of opium was shipped to 
China” (Tagliacozzo & Chang 2011, 94). The 
people of China had become addicts and 
quickly began trading their countries precious 
resources away for drugs. 
From the 1820s forward, British trade 
with China was in surplus. The enormous 
expenditure of Chinese silver used to purchase 
the illegal opium greatly exceeded the amount 
that the merchants spent on Chinese tea. From 
1828 through 1836 more than $38 million 
poured out of Qing China to import the illegal 
drug (Elman 2006, 100-101). For the first time 
an imbalance of trade had formed and China 
was on the losing end. The Chinese economy 
suffered tremendously due to the influx of 
opium being supplied by the Europeans.  
The Qing emperor understood it was 
imperative to stop the British merchants from 
continuing to poison his people. Emperor 
Qianlong gravely overestimated diplomacy. 
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The British did not rely on any form of tribute 
system. Europeans, specifically the British were 
primarily concerned with nation building by 
any means. Diplomacy would prove ineffective 
when dealing with the European Imperialists. 
Emperor Qianlong did not completely grasp 
the extent to which the Industrial Revolution 
had propelled the Europeans naval warfare 
capabilities (Elman 2005, 254-255). Had the 
emperor completely understood the 
consequences of not opening up China to trade 
with the British, he more than likely would 
have been inclined to ease his policies 
regarding the expansion of international trade.  
  
THE OPIUM WARS 
From a military standpoint, the Chinese 
were not prepared to go to war with the British. 
The Industrial Revolution that had taken place 
in the West severely handicapped the Chinese 
navy. The British naval ships had been 
seriously overhauled and the upgrades would 
swiftly overwhelm the Qing fleet. The Chinese 
fleet was largely a coastal navy which was used 
primarily to ward off local marauders and 
defend against pirates (Elman 2005, 193). The 
success of the British was predominantly 
attributed to superior naval technology. The 
aggression and imperialist nature of the British 
had led them to utilize technology to develop 
weapons capable of conquest. The British had 
superior ships, artillery, rifles, and they were 
fueled by greed. Jeffery Needham pointed out 
in Science and Civilisation in China that the 
Chinese had discovered paddle-wheel boats 
and ships as far back as the first century 
(Needham 2004, 218-219). That specific 
technology had not been recorded in Europe 
until many years later. Low and behold, it was 
the shallow draught iron paddle-steamer, 
named the Nemesis that would end up 
terrorizing the Pearl River delta. The iron 
hulled Nemesis destroyed Chinese 
fortifications and naval vessels at will. The 
British fleet simply overwhelmed the Chinese. 
A discovery contributed by the Chinese 
centuries earlier had been improved upon by 
the Europeans and used as an instrument of 
war. By the end of the First Opium War it had 
become obvious to the Qing Emperor that the 
technological advances made by the Western 
military had somehow managed to quickly 
surpass his country’s defensive capabilities.  
In order to end the bloodshed, the 
Chinese were forced by the British to agree to 
some severely lopsided peace terms. The terms 
were highly favorable for the British (Elman 
2006, 101). Being so heavily outgunned, the 
Chinese Emperor had little choice but to agree 
to the lopsided terms set by the British and sign 
the Treaty of Nanking. There were four major 
consequences of the First Opium War. The first 
peace term of The Treaty of Nanking involved 
China giving Hong Kong to England. Secondly, 
five ports, including Canton and Shanghai, 
were required to be open to trade as well as 
permanent residence (Elman 2005, 286). 
Import tariffs were then reduced to a 
maximum of 5%. Possibly the hardest pill for 
China to swallow was the extraterritoriality 
clause that allowed all foreigners who resided 
in China to be exempt from Chinese laws 
(Tagliacozzo & Chang 2011, 380-381). The 
extraterritorial concessions surrendered local 
sovereignty over to the British Crown. The 
British, by way of military strength, forced 
China to open its country up to the opium trade 
in the 1840's. China also experienced social 
turmoil in the form of the bloody Tai Ping 
rebellion, and was unable to prevent foreign 
domination of its trade. By the end of the 19th 
century, England, Germany, Russia, Japan, and 
the United States had all obliged China to trade 
with them. Russia occupied Manchuria and 
Port Arthur, Japan was in Korea, Germany was 
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in the Shantung peninsula, and the British 
were in Hong Kong. 
The Second Opium War was in many 
ways an unavoidable sequel to the first war. 
The Chinese were not ready to implement the 
terms of the Treaty of Nanking largely because 
they viewed it as being unfair. The biggest 
problem for China was that the Treaty of 
Nanking did not address the opium issue. 
Opium smuggling continued, and this only 
increased Chinese resentment of the 
foreigners. British merchants were unhappy 
because they did not see a huge rise in profits 
from trade with China after the First Opium 
War like they had anticipated. They attributed 
their displeasure to the Chinese purposely 
taking too long to implement the newly agreed 
upon policies (Encarta 2003, 321-322). Still, 
clever Chinese diplomacy and a number of 
other political distractions kept the conflict 
from further manifesting itself for a number of 
years. War with the British inevitably ensued 
and the superior power of the Europeans and 
their refusal to compromise culminated in the 
signing of the Treaty of Tianjin. This time the 
British would require among other things that 
China open up ten new ports to foreign trade. 
The Chinese resistance ultimately led to an 
1860 European invasion of the Chinese capital 
and the burning of the Summer Palace. British 
leaders required the Convention of Beijing on 
the defeated Chinese, establishing once and for 
all the right of foreign diplomatic 
representation in China's capital (Elman 2006, 
160-161). Many restrictions on foreign travel 
within China were removed, and missionaries 
received the right to work and even own 
property in China (Elman 2005, 357-358). The 
opium trade, which spurred the entire conflict, 
was finally legalized. 
The Opium Wars are extremely 
important to China's modern economic history. 
“China itself was forced to give special access 
(the ‘unequal treaties’) to certain European 
countries” (Kang 2010, 160). The two wars, and 
the unfair peace treaties that Europe had 
imposed on China, weakened their political, 
social and economic structure (Tagliacozzo & 
Chang 2011, 96-97). The Opium Wars were a 
pivotal point in both the European and Chinese 
economies. The British and Western 
penetration and colonization of China had 
spawned a whole new socioeconomic class. 
Wealthy Chinese merchants imported British 
goods and enabled the annexation of local 
markets and resources. The greed of the British 
Imperialists forced unprecedented levels of 
exploitation and taxation on the growing 
population of Chinese peasants and workers. 
China’s rulers were obliged to pay the war 
debts and finance trade deficits imposed by the 
treaties drafted by the Western imperial 
powers. The government was essentially forced 
to over tax the poorest of poor Chinese. This 
drove countless peasants to starvation and 
often insurrection. The speed at which the 
Europeans were able to prosper forced the 
Chinese to reevaluate the way that their 
country was being governed. The Opium Wars 
led the Chinese to begin “a new era of reform 
known as Self-Strengthening” (Elman 2006, 
161). The Qing dynasty recognized that China 
had fallen behind and that they must evolve in 
order to survive.  
Historically, China had based its 
economic dominance on non-interference in 
the internal affairs of its limited trading 
partners. The teachings of Confucius and their 
regional tribute system had previously afforded 
the Chinese people peace and economic 
prosperity. In sharp contrast, the Europeans, 
specifically the British imperialists, intervened 
violently in China, rearranging local economies 
to suit the needs of their empire. The British 
eliminated economic competitors and 
monopolized industries (Tagliacozzo & Chang 
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2011, 126). Within a few decades of the colonial 
powers arriving from Europe the tribute 
system and Confucian order, both of which had 
been a monumental part of Chinese society for 
over two thousand years had collapsed (Kang 
2010, 159). The British imposed their will on 
the people of China and by force they 
eventually seized control of local political, 
economic and governmental establishments. 
Chinese bureaucrats and wealthy merchants 
sought to appease the British Imperialists and 
were able to convince the emperor to grant 
debilitating extraterritorial concessions that, 
detrimental to Chinese manufacturers, opened 
its markets to the world. Adding to the strains 
that they had by this time put on the Chinese 
economy, the British, guided by greed would 
continue to cause internal rivalries and revolts 
that would continue to destabilize the 
collapsing country throughout the 19th century. 
Less than a century after the Opium 
Wars had ended, China, assisted by the 
Europeans, had plummeted and was no longer 
a dominant economic world power. The main 
arterial trading ports were controlled by 
European imperial officials and the rural areas 
were usually governed by corrupt and ruthless 
warlords.  
“Between 1841 and 1979, East Asia 
experienced interstate wars, colonization, 
anticolonial independence wars, struggles 
with state building, domestic insurgencies, 
ethnic violence, the cold war and a massive 
U.S. military, economic, and social 
presence” (Kang 2010, 160).  
China had been reduced; it had transformed 
relatively quickly to become a fledgling nation 
with a massive impoverished population 
comprised of drug addicts. The once prideful, 
Chinese, had been broken. The people of China 
were humiliated and ashamed of what had 
been allowed to transpire. It is my contention 
that opium and violence were among the 
principal reasons that the Europeans were so 
successful in turning the economic tables on 
the Chinese. Another central cause was the 
social structure (Confucianism and the tribute 
system) that had existed in China for so long. 
This social structure is perhaps why China as a 
nation, did not adapt effectively to the 
challenges posed by the Western nations after 
the Industrial Revolution.    
COMMUNISM  
  Imperialism ended in China when a 
revolt that began in late 1911 was able to 
successfully overthrow the Qing dynasty. The 
Republic of China began to take shape and by 
1912 the Chinese Nationalist Party emerged. 
The Nationalist Party could not maintain 
control and lost power by 1916. The lack of a 
unified government allowed warlords to thrive 
and the rest of the country to struggle. Despite 
once being a world power, by the late 1920’s 
China was not even a unified country. By 1921 
civil unrest caused by the Treaty of Versailles 
led the people of China to a revolutionary 
movement. China was formally unified under 
the Chinese Communist Party and all other 
names of communist groups were dropped in 
July of 1921 (Cultural China.com). The 
Communist government was able to abolish the 
extraterritorial privileges granted by the 
European imperialists. China was able to 
experience modest economic growth up until 
the war with Japan escalated in 1937 (Brandt & 
Rawski 2008, 267-269).  
The People’s Republic of China formed 
in October 1949. The Communist party, then 
unified under Mao Zedong began the process of 
reforming China, which many believe was 
unsuccessful. The Communist Party’s 
organizational discipline and propaganda, 
combined with Mao’s loyal soldiers formed a 
strong governmental structure. Mao’s system 
of government was able to infiltrate deeper 
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than the imperial system, into China’s 
countryside and urban areas (Vogel 2011, 13).    
China, led by Mao, was able to lower 
inflation, restore fiscal balance and revive the 
money economy (Perkins 1966). The economy 
in Mao’s China, despite short disruptions 
because of the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution had in deed made some 
progress. The World Bank estimated that 
between 1950 and 1975, China demonstrated 
(in certain areas) remarkable improvement 
with an average annual growth of 4.2 percent 
per capita GNP (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 19-21). 
While this was positive, it might not have 
painted a precise picture of just exactly how 
well the people of Mao’s Soviet style China 
were in fact, actually doing.  
 Even though China was a low-income 
country, they chose to pursue a strategy of high 
science and technology. Even before Mao, 
Chinese scholar Kang Youwei and other 
reformers had been aggressively pursuing the 
industrialization of China through science and 
technology. 
“In his 1905 essay on industrialization, for 
instance, Kang emphasized that China, 
like Japan, needed to master mining, 
industry, and commerce. Because 
machines had augmented the power of 
European states and enhanced the welfare 
of the people” (Elman 2006, 202).    
Many countries had been of the mind-set that 
pursuing an industrial oriented society would 
lead to quicker development than that of an 
agricultural one. At the time, economists often 
recommended political leaders to direct all 
investments toward industry. Agriculture, 
despite historically being a vital component in 
the countries prior success, did not receive 
equal attention from the government. 
Countries that followed that advice usually 
experienced brief gains, followed by failed 
development efforts (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 
467; see Timmer).    
China modeled their national system 
after the Soviets organizational structure of 
research and development (Brandt & Rawski 
2008, 191; see Naughton). Growth during 
1958-1978 was primarily made possible by the 
high rising rates of capital accumulation. That 
accumulation simply replaced productivity 
enhancement as the dominant contributor to 
GDP growth. Research by Lardy (1984), 
Bramall (1989) among others showed that 
China’s rural majority were not able to 
experience much if any improvement in their 
living standards (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 842).  
The inability to significantly improve the 
quality of living standards for the people of 
China clearly indicated the ineffectiveness of 
Mao’s innovation system. A leading cause had 
been attributed to the total factor of production 
in the agricultural sector. In 1979 the total 
factor of production was lower than it had been 
previously in 1952, an important point that was 
highlighted by Chow (1989). During a similar 
period, a contrasting study of the industrial 
sector showed slight growth (Brandt & Rawski 
2008, 86-88). It many peoples opinion, Mao 
focused too much of China’s resources on 
industrial initiatives. The government needed 
to prioritize and focus even more of its 
attention, like it had done so effectively in the 
past, on agriculture.       
The neglect of rural investment led 
agricultural productivity to be low, which 
inflated the cost of food. Property rights, weak 
incentives for farmers and the lack of markets 
all resulted in poor agricultural output. The 
Chinese infrastructure and lack of 
transportation prevented food from getting 
from the farms to people's homes before it 
spoiled. Poor management of the land 
simultaneously exhausted the soil and the 
water supply. The low productivity of China’s 
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agricultural industry resulted in severe food 
supply shortages that manifested into famines. 
The country, while indicating many positive 
signs of growth, had a gigantic problem on its 
hands. The country’s food supply was an 
obstacle; that, given China’s past agricultural 
successes and innovation should have been a 
relatively easy to situation to overcome. In 
order to improve the economy, Mao and the 
rest of his party needed to immediately address 
China’s food supply crisis. Instead, according 
to Ezra Vogel, Mao chose a different course of 
action, “an ill-advised utopian debacle that led 
to massive food shortages and millions of 
unnatural deaths” (Vogel 2011, 13). Sadly, 30-
40 million Chinese died of starvation in a short 
span of only three years, from 1959-1961 
(Brandt & Rawski 2008, 191-192). The country 
would eventually try to tackle this crisis from 
two different angles. They would look to 
produce more food, for less people.  
China would once again need to 
restructure its governmental system in order to 
successfully transition back to prosperity. 
Mao’s Soviet style Communism promoted 
isolationism and had been suppressing China’s 
progress. “When China’s leaders made the 
decision to initiate economic reform in 1978, 
the top leaders, especially Deng Xiaoping, 
understood that their system had been 
profoundly damaged by the final twenty years 
of Maoism.” (Brandt 2008, 93, see Naughton). 
The new leaders intended to bring the economy 
back to life and restore order to the broken 
socialist political system.   
Deng Xiaoping thought that in order to 
permanently revitalize China, among other 
reforms, a shift in the countries education 
system was needed. If the country were going 
to become competitive in the global economy, 
they would need to focus on academics. Mao’s 
previous system regarding university entrance 
exams would need to be revised. Mao’s 
eventual successor Deng Xiaoping, believed 
that the most qualified students should be 
admitted into the university, period. Mao’s 
earlier methodology of “proper class 
background” had allowed wealthy imbeciles 
into the university instead of intelligent 
peasants (Vogel 2011, 205).  
 
CAPITALISM  
In 1980 China’s government, headed by 
Deng Xiaoping, began to undergo a dramatic 
change in its economic strategy: Over the next 
thirty or so years, China opened the country to 
extensive foreign investment. Deng believed 
that competition from foreign companies 
would force Chinese businesses to become 
stronger (Vogel 2011, 476). Chinese industries 
were finally allowed to privatize. This 
privatization in turn, set in motion a process of 
income concentration founded on a measured 
strategy of reconstructing a dominant 
economic class connected to overseas 
capitalists. Severe competition was created 
across many industries. “A large number of 
new (mostly small) firms were founded in most 
transitional economies” (Brandt & Rawski 
2008, 68,). The profit erosion that ensued 
because of competition urged many existing 
enterprises to search for revolutionary 
processes and product innovations in order to 
ensure their survival.               
The Chinese government re-directed 
enormous public subsidies to encourage large 
amounts of capitalist growth by dismantling its 
tired national system of free public education 
and health care. They also ended subsidized 
public housing for hundreds of millions of 
peasants and urban factory workers; deciding 
instead to provide funding to real estate 
investors for the construction of private 
apartments and office high-rise buildings 
(Brandt & Rawski 2008, 737). China’s new 
capitalist approach as well as its rapid growth 
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was founded on the insightful structural 
modifications and substantial investments 
made possible by Mao’s regime. The boom in 
China’s private sector was established by the 
huge public outlays that had been made since 
1949. It was Mao’s initial investment in China’s 
infrastructure and industry that paved the way 
for capitalisms success. Through ample 
research many scholars have determined 
China’s rapid economic growth initially began 
closer to 1950 than 1980. Also, that growth was 
based on the development of its internal 
market; it’s rapidly growing corps of scientists, 
skilled technicians and laborers. Additionally, 
the societal structure which both protected and 
promoted the working class and peasantry 
were products also yielded from Communism. 
However, if the once great nation was going to 
survive in the global economy, the country 
desperately needed to embrace the necessary 
economic reforms.  
REFORM        
China’s earliest and most important 
economic reform policy was the household 
responsibility system (HRS) that was 
introduced to the agricultural industry. 
“Starting with the restoration of household 
agriculture in the late 1970’s, China has 
implemented a long sequence of increasingly 
coherent, focused, but still partial, gradual, and 
yet unfinished economic reforms” (Brandt & 
Rawski 2008, 20). HRS was implemented in 
rural areas between 1978 and 1983 in an effort 
to increase agricultural output. The Mao 
system of commune style farming that had 
been allowed to decimate the agricultural 
industry would be replaced with a more 
productive incentive based system (Brandt & 
Rawski 2008, 169-170). During the reform era, 
China was able to increase its food production 
to the point that they were able to become an 
exporter (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 469-471). 
“Once the reform began, every possible metric 
confirms that China’s farm sector surpassed 
results achieved during the previous three 
decades by enormous margins” (Brandt & 
Rawski 2008, 475). Food production had 
finally outpaced the growth in population. The 
immediate impact that the reform policies had 
created, instilled a higher level confidence of 
the people in the government.  
In an effort to manage its population 
growth, Chinese leadership introduced a policy 
in 1979 that would allow couples in certain 
regions to have only one child. The leadership 
firmly believed that the sudden rapid growth in 
population that had taken place over the prior 
few decades had been the root cause of China’s 
turbulent economic times (Brandt & Rawski 
2008, 138). The tempered growth in China’s 
population had a positive impact on the overall 
productivity. During the course of a typical 
human’s lifespan, people are only productive 
during the middle of their lives. When people 
are young or old, they obviously consume more 
than they are able to produce (Brandt & Rawski 
2008). China’s one-child policy temporarily 
solved a crisis, but it at the same time was 
creating what would eventually manifest into a 
whole new problem. However, the Chinese 
leadership, through decisive reform was able to 
manage their way out of the initial crisis; they 
will do the same with the new one. 
 Modern China’s rise to becoming a 
world economic power is based on its 
enormous productive capacity. Output per 
worker has tripled in China between 1980 and 
2004. Only India has come close to being able 
to compete with China’s productivity (Brandt & 
Rawski 2008, 26-27). 
 In 1978 China had only 12 firms directly 
controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
which were authorized to conduct foreign 
trade. By 2001 that number had ballooned to 
over 35,000 (Lardy 2002, 40-42). “When Deng 
became preeminent leader in 1978, China’s 
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trade with the world totaled less than $10 
billion; within three decades, it had expanded a 
hundredfold” (Vogel 2011, 697). Regarding 
trade as well as investment, China has always 
operated under a strict policy of non-
interference when it comes to the internal 
affairs of its trading partners. Unlike the West, 
China did not constantly participate in wars for 
natural resources; instead its government 
chose to enter into lucrative contractual 
agreements for its desired commodities. 
China has powerful trading, financial 
and investment networks throughout the 
world. Additionally, China has a host of 
powerful economic partners which share a 
vested interest in their continued success. 
These partnerships have become essential for 
the sustained growth of many countries 
throughout the developing world. “China’s 
adoption of one of the developing world’s most 
open trade and FDI regimes stands as one of 
the most significant accomplishments of the 
reform era” (Brandt & Rawski 2008, 676). 
While foreign capital began to profit in China, 
it did so within the agenda of the government’s 
priorities and regulations. The government’s 
dynamic export strategy combined with an 
ingenious monetary policy has led to giant 
trade surpluses. These surpluses have afforded 
China to become one of the world’s largest 
creditors, especially for United States debt. In 
order to maintain its position among these 
industries, China must regularly procure 
enormous amounts of raw materials. In order 
to facilitate the continued procurement of these 
materials, China has large-scale foreign 
investments and trade agreements with agro-
mineral export countries from around the 
world. China has replaced the United States 
and Europe as the main trading partner in 
many countries.  
China’s ruling politicians at first, more 
or less embraced the idea of pirating technical 
intellectual property and accessing overseas 
markets from foreign firms in exchange for 
providing cheap, labor that was well below the 
going market rate. The sustained growth in 
China’s manufacturing sector has been a result 
of highly concentrated public investments, high 
profits, technological innovations and a well-
protected domestic market (Brandt & Rawski 
2008, 24). China’s leadership realized that 
innovation needed to be a priority. They 
understood that technological advances were 
going to play a vital role in guaranteeing the 
future success and sustainability of their 
economy. By 1985 China had restructured its 
patent laws and identified its shortcomings 
with dealing with intellectual property rights 
(Brandt & Rawski 2008, 294). In December of 
2001 China was accepted into the World Trade 
Organization and officially recognized as a 
valued partner in the world’s economic 
community.  
  Throughout history Chinese leadership 
has repeatedly demonstrated that it prefers 
diplomacy to military strength. “Throughout 
the 1980’s, then, the Chinese government 
decreased the proportion of the budget going to 
the military” (Vogel 2011, 541). Deng Xiaoping 
preferred to keep military expenditures down 
in order to channel more resources to advance 
the civilian economy (Vogel 2011, 545). As a 
result of that investment, China has been able 
to improve its GDP on an average of 9.5 
percent annually between 1978 and 2005 
(Brandt & Rawski 2008, 878). On the other 
end of the spectrum, the United States military 
spending is more than five times greater than 
China’s and its economy has stalled (Shah, 
2012). It appears that once again China has 
chosen economic superiority over military 
power. China, with the second largest economy 
in the world is in glaring contrast to the largest 
economy, the United States, where an 
enormous military force continually erodes its 
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civilian economy. The Chinese have decided to 
invest the majority of their resources in their 
people’s futures and not in foreign wars.  
CONCLUSION   
It is my contention that a variety of 
Chinese contributions expedited Europe’s 
prolific economic development and aided in its 
expansion. Perhaps with the assistance of 
innovations derived from China, the European 
economy was able to forge ahead of China’s 
economy. In addition to the Europeans 
developments, there were several other 
contributing factors that led to the fall of the 
Chinese economy. Though modern opinion is 
beginning to change, many historians, 
especially European historians accredit the 
British imperial dominance of China to the 
technological supremacy of the Europeans. It is 
true that modern science and technology 
propelled the Europeans ahead of China. But, 
the contributions made solely by China as well 
as knowledge achieved by teamwork amongst 
both the Europeans and Chinese alike is what 
bridged the gap for the Europeans to propel 
ahead (Needham 2004, 231). It is my 
contention that opium and violence were 
among the principal reasons that the 
Europeans were so successful in trading 
economic places with the Chinese. Another 
central cause was the social structure 
(Confucianism and the tribute system) that had 
existed in China for so long. This social 
structure is perhaps why China as a nation, did 
not adapt effectively to the challenges posed by 
the Western nations after the Industrial 
Revolution. The examples given should help to 
explain that a distinct correlation does in fact 
exist between Europe’s rapid economic growth 
and the fall of China during the 18th century. In 
spite of substantial adversity, China has re-
emerged as one of the most dominant 
economic forces in the world. China has 
quickly earned the position as the world’s 
second largest economy and is poised for much 
continued success. Modern China, as a world 
power, is exceptionally stronger than it was.     
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